Arbeitspapier

Harassment, Corruption and Economic Policy

This paper introduces harassment in a model of bribery and corruption. We characterize the harassment equilibrium and show that taxpayers with all possible levels of income participate in such an equilibrium. Harassment has a regressive bias. Harassment cost as such may not affect tax revenue. However, when the decision to file tax-returns is endogenized, harassment cost can affect the filing pattern and hence the revenue collection. We study the nature of the equilibrium under imperfect information when different types of taxpayers and different types of auditors are introduced in the system.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 189

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Corruption
Harassment
Filing

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Marjit, Sugata
Mukherjee, Vivekananda
Mukherjee, Arijit
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
1999

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Marjit, Sugata
  • Mukherjee, Vivekananda
  • Mukherjee, Arijit
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 1999

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