Artikel
Conflict prevention by Bayesian persuasion
Drawing upon the Bayesian persuasion literature, I show that a mediator can provide conflicting parties strategically with information to decrease the ex‐ante war probability. In a conflict between two parties with private information about military strength, the mediator generates information about each conflicting party's strength and commits to sharing the obtained information with the respective opponent. The conflicting parties can be convinced not to fight each other. The conflicting parties benefit from mediation, as the ex‐ante war probability is reduced. The benefit is taken up by weak conflicting parties. This benefit is larger when war is costlier and when the war probability absent mediation is higher.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Journal of Public Economic Theory ; ISSN: 1467-9779 ; Volume: 23 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 710-731
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Hennigs, Raphaela
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wiley
- (where)
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Hoboken, NJ
- (when)
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2021
- DOI
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doi:10.1111/jpet.12511
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Hennigs, Raphaela
- Wiley
Time of origin
- 2021