Monografie
Market conduct and endogenous lobbying: evidence from the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry
- Language
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Englisch
- Identifier
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oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11338
1192184009
- Series
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Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie; Bd. 02-35
Subject
Wirtschaft
Contributor
- URN
- Rights
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Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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26.01.2023, 1:56 PM CET
Object type
- Monografie
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