Monografie
Why are stabilisations delayed : an experiment with an application to all pay auctions
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Identifier
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1188468677
- Reihe
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Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008); 04-06
Thema
Finanzpolitik ; Reorganisation ; Spieltheorie ; Auktionstheorie ; Public-Choice-Theorie
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
- URN
- Rechteinformation
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Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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26.01.2023, 13:56 MEZ
Objekttyp
- Monografie
Beteiligte
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