Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel
Cooperation under alternative punishment institutions: an experiment
While peer punishment has been shown to increase group cooperation, there is open debate on how cooperative norms can emerge and on what motives drive individuals to punish. In a public good experiment we compared alternative punishment institutions and found (1) higher cooperation levels under a consensual punishment institution than under autonomous individual punishment; (2) similar cooperation levels under sequential and simultaneous punishment institutions.
- Extent
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Seite(n): 273-282
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71(2)
- Subject
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Psychologie
Sozialpsychologie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Casari, Marco
Luini, Luigi
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (when)
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2009
- DOI
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-290913
- Rights
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GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
- Last update
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21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST
Data provider
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GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Zeitschriftenartikel
Associated
- Casari, Marco
- Luini, Luigi
Time of origin
- 2009
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Monopolizing Sanctioning Power under Noise Eliminates Perverse Punishment But Does Not Increase Cooperation
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Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory
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Monopolizing Sanctioning Power under Noise Eliminates Perverse Punishment But Does Not Increase Cooperation
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