- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource, 20 Seiten
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
In: Financial Management(53), H. 1, S.99-118 - ISSN 0046-3892
In: © 2024 Financial Management Association International., Malden, Mass.
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wer)
-
Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
- (wann)
-
2024
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:gbv:27-dbt-60119-3
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:52 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Imbierowicz, Björn
- Streitz, Daniel
- Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
Entstanden
- 2024
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