Hochschulschrift

Institutional competition between optional codes in European contract law : a theoretical and empirical analysis

to connected objects

Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main

ISBN: 9783658058005
3658058005

Dimensions: 21 cm

Extent: XX, 311 S.

Language: Englisch

Notes: Zugl.: Hamburg, Bucerius Law School, Diss., 2013

Keyword: Europäische Union
Europäische Union
Vertragsrecht
Systemwettbewerb
Rechtsvereinheitlichung

Event: Veröffentlichung

(where): Wiesbaden

(who): Springer Gabler

(when): 2014

Creator: Wulf, Alexander J.

Table of contents: https://d-nb.info/104985053X/04

Rights: Bei diesem Objekt liegt nur das Inhaltsverzeichnis digital vor. Der Zugriff darauf ist unbeschränkt möglich.

Last update: 11.03.2025, 12:23 PM CET

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Object type

Hochschulschrift

Associated

Wulf, Alexander J.
Springer Gabler

Time of origin

2014

Other Objects (12)

Arbeitspapier

An optional European contract law code: advantages and disadvantages

Abschnitt

"Optional Neutrality."

Grafik

"Position optional"

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Learning through institutional competition

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Optional defaultable markets

Arbeitspapier

Competition, regulation and institutional quality

Hochschulschrift

A contract-theoretical approach to merger remedies

Optional decompositions under constraints

Arbeitspapier

Optional decompositions under constraints

Illustration

FOG SIGNALS - OPTIONAL SIGNALS

Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup

Arbeitspapier

Institutional competition, political process and holdup

Arbeitspapier

An optional European contract law code: advantages and disadvantages

Abschnitt

"Optional Neutrality."

Grafik

"Position optional"

Arbeitspapier

Learning through institutional competition

Artikel

Optional defaultable markets

Arbeitspapier

Competition, regulation and institutional quality

Hochschulschrift

A contract-theoretical approach to merger remedies

Optional decompositions under constraints

Arbeitspapier

Optional decompositions under constraints

Illustration

FOG SIGNALS - OPTIONAL SIGNALS

Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup

Arbeitspapier

Institutional competition, political process and holdup

Arbeitspapier

An optional European contract law code: advantages and disadvantages

Abschnitt

"Optional Neutrality."

Grafik

"Position optional"

Arbeitspapier

Learning through institutional competition

Artikel

Optional defaultable markets

Arbeitspapier

Competition, regulation and institutional quality

Hochschulschrift

A contract-theoretical approach to merger remedies

Optional decompositions under constraints

Arbeitspapier

Optional decompositions under constraints

Illustration

FOG SIGNALS - OPTIONAL SIGNALS

Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup

Arbeitspapier

Institutional competition, political process and holdup

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Institutional competition between optional codes in European contract law : a theoretical and empirical analysis

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Other Objects (12)

An optional European contract law code: advantages and disadvantages

"Optional Neutrality."

"Position optional"

Learning through institutional competition

Optional defaultable markets

Competition, regulation and institutional quality

A contract-theoretical approach to merger remedies

Optional decompositions under constraints

Optional decompositions under constraints

FOG SIGNALS - OPTIONAL SIGNALS

Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup

Institutional competition, political process and holdup

An optional European contract law code: advantages and disadvantages

"Optional Neutrality."

"Position optional"

Learning through institutional competition

Optional defaultable markets

Competition, regulation and institutional quality

A contract-theoretical approach to merger remedies

Optional decompositions under constraints

Optional decompositions under constraints

FOG SIGNALS - OPTIONAL SIGNALS

Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup

Institutional competition, political process and holdup

An optional European contract law code: advantages and disadvantages

"Optional Neutrality."

"Position optional"

Learning through institutional competition

Optional defaultable markets

Competition, regulation and institutional quality

A contract-theoretical approach to merger remedies

Optional decompositions under constraints

Optional decompositions under constraints

FOG SIGNALS - OPTIONAL SIGNALS

Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup

Institutional competition, political process and holdup

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