Arbeitspapier
Unemployment and gang crime: could prosperity backfire?
Empirical evidence reveals that unemployment tends to increase property crime but that it has no effect on violent crime. To explain these facts, we examine a model of criminal gangs and suggest that there is a substitution effect between property crime and violent crime at work. In the model, non-monetary valuation of gang membership is private knowledge. Thus the leaders face a trade-off between less crime per member in large gangs and more crime per member in small gangs. Unemployment increases the relative attractiveness of large and less violent gangs engaging more in property crime.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1944
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Thema
-
violence
crime
gangs
unemployment
identity
Kriminalität
Gewalt
Arbeitslosigkeit
Kriminalitätsökonomik
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Poutvaara, Panu
Priks, Mikael
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Poutvaara, Panu
- Priks, Mikael
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2007