Arbeitspapier

Unemployment and gang crime: could prosperity backfire?

Empirical evidence reveals that unemployment tends to increase property crime but that it has no effect on violent crime. To explain these facts, we examine a model of criminal gangs and suggest that there is a substitution effect between property crime and violent crime at work. In the model, non-monetary valuation of gang membership is private knowledge. Thus the leaders face a trade-off between less crime per member in large gangs and more crime per member in small gangs. Unemployment increases the relative attractiveness of large and less violent gangs engaging more in property crime.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1944

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Thema
violence
crime
gangs
unemployment
identity
Kriminalität
Gewalt
Arbeitslosigkeit
Kriminalitätsökonomik
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Poutvaara, Panu
Priks, Mikael
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Poutvaara, Panu
  • Priks, Mikael
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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