Arbeitspapier
Sale Of Visas: A Smuggler's Final Song?
Is there a way of eliminating human smuggling? We set up a model to simultaneously determine the provision of human smuggling services and the demand from would-be migrants. A visa-selling policy may be successful at eliminating human smugglers by eroding their profits but it necessarily increases immigration. In contrast, re-enforced repression decreases migration but uses the help of cartelized smugglers. To overcome this trade-off we study how legalisation and repression can be combined to eliminate human smuggling while controlling migration flows. This policy mix also has the advantage that the funds raised by visa sales can be used to finance additional investments in border and internal controls (employer sanctions and deportations). Simulations of the policy implications highlight the complementarities between repression and legalisation and call into question the current policies.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CReAM Discussion Paper Series ; No. 17/12
International Migration
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Economics of Regulation
Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
migration policies
market structure
legalisation
human smuggling
Mesnard, Alice
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Auriol, Emmanuelle
- Mesnard, Alice
- Centre for Research & Analysis of Migration (CReAM), Department of Economics, University College London
Entstanden
- 2012
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