Arbeitspapier

Maastricht criteria versus stability pact

It is generally believed that fiscal consolidations should occur prior to a country's admission to the European Monetary Union (EMU). This paper argues that the fiscal Maastricht Criteria require badly timed, costly adjustments while not guaranteeing sustained fiscal restraint. An effective Stability Pact is not only necessary, but should replace the Maastricht Criteria altogether. These conclusions are based on simulations scrutinising the effects both of contractionary fiscal policies and of joining a monetary union. In a case study type analysis it is shown that there is a strong case for both policy changes to happen at the same time.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series ; No. WP05/06

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
International Policy Coordination and Transmission
Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance: Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
Thema
transition to a monetary union
fiscal policy
European Monetary Union
regime change
simulation
MULTIMOD

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bohn, Frank
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University College Dublin, Department of Economics
(wo)
Dublin
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:20 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bohn, Frank
  • University College Dublin, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2005

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