The Role of Electoral Incentives for Policy Innovation: Evidence from the U.S. Welfare Reform

Arbeitspapier

We investigate whether the decision to experiment with novel policies is influenced by electoral incentives. Our empirical setting is the U.S. welfare reform in 1996, which marked the most dramatic shift in social policy since the New Deal. We find that electoral incentives matter: governors with strong electoral support are less likely to experiment with policies than governors with little electoral support. Yet, governors who cannot be reelected experiment more than governors striving for reelection. The importance of electoral incentives is robust to controlling for governor ideology, voter preferences for redistribution, the influence of the legislature, or for learning among states. A comparison of the role of governor ideology and electoral incentives reveals that both contribute about equally to policy experimentation.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6964

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
• Subject: policy innovation ; electoral incentives ; welfare reform ; spillovers

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bernecker, Andreas ; Boyer, Pierre C. ; Gathmann, Christina
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2018

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/176983
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET