- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; No. 4189
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Schlagwort
-
Haushaltsökonomik
Verhandlungstheorie
Steuer
Unvollständiger Vertrag
Familienbesteuerung
Steuerwirkung
Wohlfahrtsanalyse
Theorie
Haushaltsökonomie
Verhandlungsspiel
Verhandlungstheorie
Steuer
Kontrakttheorie
Haushaltsbesteuerung
Steuerwirkung
Wohlfahrtseffekt
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wer)
-
Forschungsinst. zur Zukunft der Arbeit
- (wann)
-
2009
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20090612132
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
14.08.2025, 10:55 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
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Beteiligte
- Apps, Patricia
- Rees, Ray
- Forschungsinst. zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Entstanden
- 2009
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