Inefficient lobbying, populism and oligarchy

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyses the efficiency consequences of lobbying in a production economy with imperfect commitment. We first show that the Pareto efficiency result found for truthful equilibria of common agency games in static exchange economies no longer holds under these more general conditions. We construct a model of pressure groups where the set of e.cient truthful common-agency equilibria has measure zero. Equilibria are generally inefficient as a direct result of the existence of groups with conflicting interests, which allocate real resources to lobbying. If lobbies representing "the poor " and "the rich " have identical organizational capacities, we show that these equilibria are biased towards the poor, who have a comparative advantage in politics, rather than in production. If the pressure groups di.er in their organizational capacity, both pro-rich (oligarchic) and pro-poor (populist) equilibria may arise, all of which are inefficient with respect to the constrained optimum.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Texto para discussão ; No. 483

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Interessenpolitik ; Interessenvertretung ; Oligarchie ; Effizienz

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Campante, Filipe R. ; Ferreira, Francisco H. G.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia
• (where): Rio de Janeiro
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/175970
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET