Artikel

One-dimensional mechanism design

We prove a general possibility result for collective decision problems where individual allocations are one-dimensional, preferences are single-peaked (strictly convex), and feasible allocation profiles cover a closed convex set. Special cases include the celebrated median voter theorem (Black 1948, Dummett and Farquharson 1961) and the division of a nondisposable commodity by the uniform rationing rule (Sprumont 1991). We construct a canonical peak-only rule that equalizes, in the leximin sense, individual gains from an arbitrary benchmark allocation: it is efficient, group-strategyproof, fair, and (for most problems) continuous. These properties leave room for many other rules, except for symmetric nondisposable division problems.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 587-619 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
Single-peaked preferences
strategyproof mechanisms
leximin ordering
voting
rationing

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Moulin, Hervé
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2017

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE2307
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Moulin, Hervé
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2017

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