Why can’t we say what cognition is (at least for the time being)

Abstract: Some philosophers search for the mark of the cognitive: a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions identifying all instances of cognition. They claim that the mark of the cognitive is needed to steer the development of cognitive science on the right path. Here, I argue that, at least at present, it cannot be provided. First (§2), I identify some of the factors motivating the search for a mark of the cognitive, each yielding a desideratum the mark is supposed to satisfy (§2.1). I then (§2.2) highlight a number of tensions in the literature on the mark of the cognitive, suggesting they’re best resolved by distinguishing two distinct programs. The first program (§3) is that of identifying a mark of the cognitive capturing our everyday notion of cognition. I argue that such a program is bound to fail for a number of reasons: it is not clear whether such an everyday notion exists; and even if it existed, it would not be able to spell out individually necessary and.... https://philosophymindscience.org/index.php/phimisci/article/view/9664

Angaben zum Objekt

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Why can’t we say what cognition is (at least for the time being) ; volume:4 ; year:2023 ; Philosophy and the mind sciences ; 4 (2023)

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Urheber: Facchin, Marco

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2023.9664
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023041918541908017027
• Rechteinformation: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 14.08.2025, 10:50 MESZ