Heterogeneous international agreements: If per capita emission levels matter

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies the incentives for international cooperation if (some) countries prefer a more equitable distribution of per capita emission levels. The impact of such an equity preference is analyzed first for a bilateral, and then for a multilateral environmental problem. We show that - contrary to the two-country-case - for the latter there is no uniform percentage reduction of emissions that makes all countries better off. Rather, equity oriented countries (for example developing countries) enter a coalition only if they do not have to reduce as much. While equity preferences improve upon the prospects of cooperation if countries are not too different with respect to their per capita levels, if countries differ largely in population size and per capita emissions, generally no coalition will be stable without restrictions on entry into or exit out of a coalition. In such a situation, equity-orientation does not improve upon the prospects for cooperation.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 102.2002

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Public Goods ; Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics: General
• Thema: international environmental negotiations ; equity preference ; coalition formation ; per capita emission levels ; Umweltabkommen ; Luftreinhaltung ; Klimaschutz ; Verhandlungen ; Koalition ; Theorie ; Welt

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Lange, Andreas
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/119710
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ