Perspectival self-consciousness and ego-dissolution : An analysis of (some) altered states of consciousness

Abstract: It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness (PFP-Awareness): a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to.... https://www.philosophymindscience.org/index.php/phimisci/article/view/44

Angaben zum Objekt

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Perspectival self-consciousness and ego-dissolution ; volume:1 ; number:I ; day:12 ; month:02 ; year:2020 ; Philosophy and the mind sciences ; 1, Heft I (12.02.2020)

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Urheber: Miguel Angel Sebastian

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.44
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2020051409574114796194
• Rechteinformation: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 14.08.2025, 10:49 MESZ