Arbeitspapier
Consensus-halving via Theorems of Borsuk-Ulam and Tucker
In this paper we show how theorems of Borsuk-Ulam and Tucker can be used to construct a consensus-halving: a division of an object into two portions so that each of n people believe the portions are equally split. Moreover, the division takes at most n cuts, which is best possible. This extends prior work using methods from combinatorial topology to solve fair division problems. Several applications of consensus-halving are discussed.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Claremont Colleges Working Papers in Economics ; No. 2001-03
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Simmons, Forest W.
Su, Francis
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Claremont McKenna College, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Claremont, CA
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Simmons, Forest W.
- Su, Francis
- Claremont McKenna College, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2001
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